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COMMENTS
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETICS
I. INTRODUCTION
Those seemingly endless years spent in school serve to instruct the
juvenile audience in considerably more than the basic skills of reading,
writing, and summing. The schools further the socialization process begun
by the family and either reinforce or alter what the children have already
learned concerning their place in society and the type of behavior ex-
pected of them.' This is reflected in the enormous impact the formal
education process has in inculcating traditional sexual roles and stereotypes.
If girls are sent to classes in home economics and boys to classes in me-
chanical drawing and automotive mechanics, the message is clear - the
man's role is to enter the job market and bring home the bacon and the
woman's place is to remain at home and fry it.2
School-sponsored athletic programs, long considered an integral part
of education,3 have also served to reinforce sexual stereotypes. Discrimina-
tion in athletics on the basis of sex has been the subject of much contro-
versy 4 and has generated many scholarly articles. 5 Notwithstanding pre-
vious efforts in the field, further examination of the problem is warranted
1. See Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing
Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEXAs L. REv. 103, 103-04 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Preventing Sex Discrimination]. See generally Comment, Sex Dis-
crimination, The Textbook Case, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1312 (1974) ; Comment, Teaching
Woman Her Place: The Role of Public Education in the Development of Sex Roles,
24 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (1973).
2. See note 1 supra. See also Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional
and Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705, 733-37
(1973).
3. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18
(1971); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 891 (5th Cir.
1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
4. An example of the controversy surrounding sex discrimination in school-
sponsored athletics was the reaction to the regulations proposed by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), 39 Fed. Reg. 22228-22240 (1974), which
were promulgated pursuant to Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681 et seq. (Supp. V, 1975). During the interim between publication and adoption
of the regulations, HEW invited interested parties to submit comments, objections,
and suggestions. Over 9,700 responses were received, many of them relating to
section 86.36, the regulation governing administration of athletic programs. See 40
Fed. Reg. 24128, 24134 (1975).
5. See Stroud, Sex Discrimination in High School Athletics, 6 IND. L. REV. 661
(1973) ; Preventing Sex Discrimination, supra note 1; Comment, Equality in Athletics:
The Cheerleader v. The Athlete, 19 S.D.L. REv. 428 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Equality in Athletics]; Note, Sex Discrimination in High School Athletics, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 339 (1972). For a more recent discussion of the problem, see Note, Sex
Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IOWA L. REv. 420 (1975).
(876)
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in light of the adoption of Title IX of the 1972 Educational Amendments
(Title IX) 6 and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto,7 particularly
section 86.41, which sets forth guidelines for the administration of athletic
programs.8
Using applicable common law and statutory standards, this comment
will examine from several perspectives the constitutionality of section
86.41 of the Title IX regulations. Part II concentrates on the standard
of review articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in equal
protection challenges to sex-based laws. Part III analyzes the manner in
which state and federal courts have resolved cases involving sex discrimina-
tion in athletics. The constitutionality of section 86.41 is the focus of
Part IV. Following a general survey of the scope of Title IX, section
86.41 is measured against the statutory goals and standards developed by
Congress in its attempt to deal with sex bias and is analyzed in light of
the constitutional standards utilized by the Supreme Court.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: A DIFFERENT BALLGAME
Prior to its decision in Reed v. Reed,9 the Supreme Court had never
found a sex-based classification to be violative of the guarantees of equal
protection contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.10 The Court
analyzed claims that sex-based statutory distinctions violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by inquiring whether a
rational relationship 1 existed between the classification and a permissible
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (Supp. V, 1975).
7. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1 et seq. (1975). The final version of the regulations became
effective on July 21, 1975.
8. Id. § 86.41.
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
10. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YAL, L.J. 871, 876 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Brown]. Application of the rational relation or minimum scrutiny
standard of review, coupled with the Court's acceptance of stereotyped notions of a
woman's capabilities and need for protection, dictated this result. See notes 11-14
and accompanying text infra.
11. 404 U.S. at 78-79. For an influential discussion of the theoretical basis of
the rational relation test, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61 (1911), the court articulated the classic statement of the practical application of
the rational relation test:
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done
only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary ....
A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice
it results in some inequality . . . . When the classification in such a law is called
in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed . . . . One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis . . ..
Id. at 78. See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
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state objective. 12 Under, the rational relation test, a strong presumption
existed in favor of the constitutionality of the classification employed in
the challenged statute or regulation; the burden was upon the complainant
to demonstrate that the classification was wholly without a rational basis
and was, in fact, premised upon factors totally irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of a permissible state purpose.'8 Since some relationship between the
classification and the statutory purpose could usually be perceived, the
application of this standard frequently resulted not in minimum scrutiny,
but in no scrutiny at all. 14 ,
Reed v. Reed signaled the advent of a new standard of constitutional
review in sex discrimination cases. In Reed, the Court struck down an
Idaho law giving automatic preference to males in administering a dece-
dent's estate when male and female relatives were similarly situated1 on
the ground that the arbitrary preference in favor of males could not with-
stand the mandate of the equal protection clause.'( The Court summarized
the applicable standard of review as follows:
[The statute] provides that different treatment be accorded to the
applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a classifica-
tion subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause .... The
Equal Protection Clause . . . does . . deny to States the power to
legislate that different 'treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
12. For example, in Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912), Montana
imposed a license fee for all those engaged in the laundry business with the exception
of establishments which employed more than two women. The Court approved the
exemption, observing that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere by creating
a fictitious equality where there is a real difference." Id. at 63. In Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948), a statute prohibiting women from working as bartenders unless
they were wives or daughters of male tavern proprietors was found to be a reasonable
exercise of the state's power to "reduce or eliminate moral and social problems." Id.
at 446. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), was one of the last cases wherein a
sex-based classification under equal protection attack was saved by minimum scrutiny.
The Hoyt Court found itself unable to conclude that automatic exemption from jury
service for women was not based upon a reasonable classification since "woman is
still regarded as the center of home and family life." 368 U.S. at 62. Hoyt was subse-
quently overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533-37 (1975).
In addition to rejecting equal protection attacks upon sex-based classifications,
the Court rejected other constitutional challenges to statutes employing sexual classi-
fications. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (statute prohibiting
employment of women in factories and laundries for more than 10 hours per day
upheld against challenge based upon right to contract) ; Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (privileges and immunities clause does not compel states to
admit women to the practice of law).
13. See note 11 supra.
14. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
15. 404 U.S. at 71. The statute provided in pertinent part: "[O]f several persons
claiming and equally entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females ... "
Id. at 73, quoting IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948).
16. 404 U.S. at 76. It is interesting to note that Ms. Reed made no assertion
that the classification denied her any fundamental right to administer her deceased
son's estate. The Court, moreover, rejected her argument that sex was a suspect
classification. See Ginsberg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 CTNN. L. REV. 1, 17
(1975) ; notes 25-27 infra. :
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statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated
to the objective of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of. the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' 7
Significantly, the state's justification of administrative convenience was
rejected, despite the Court's admission that it "was not without some
legitimacy."'18 This unwillingness to accept the state's rationale makes it
clear that more than minimum scrutiny was being used, since virtually
any conceivable justification had, in the past, saved the classification under
that standard.' 9 The alleged objective of the statutory scheme in Reed
was to "establish degrees of entitlement of various classes of persons in
accordance with their varying degrees and kind of relationship to the
intestate. '20 This was a permissible objective, but the sex-based classifica-
tion did not rest upon a difference bearing a "fair and substantial" relation
to that objective. Reed, then, stands for the proposition that "degrees of
entitlement of various classes of persons" to perform such duties as the
administration of an estate must be determined upon an individual basis,
without regard to sex.21
Two years after Reed, the Court again rejected administrative con-
venience as a justification for the different treatment accorded similarly
situated men and women. In Frontiero v. Richardson,22 the Court in-
validated a statutory scheme which presumed that wives of servicemen
were dependents for purposes of obtaining increased fringe benefits, but
that husbands of servicewomen were not dependents unless it could be dem-
onstrated that they actually relied upon their wives for one-half of their
support. 23 Four members of the Court, relying upon Reed, declared that
17. 404 U.S. at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920) (emphasis added).
18. 404 U.S. at 76.
19. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, after setting forth
the applicable standard of review, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court,
stated that the question presented by Reed was whether the sex of the parties competing
for letters of administration bore a rational relation to the state objective. 404 U.S.
at 76. Although it seems clear that the rational relation test (see notes 10-13 and
accompanying text supra) was not being applied in Reed, some courts have used this
language to uphold different treatment of the sexes in school-sponsored athletics.
See notes 109-11 and accompanying text infra.
20. 404 U.S. at 77.
21. This conclusion has also been reached via a due process rather than an equal
protection route. See notes 76 & 201 infra.
22. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
23. Id. at 679-80. Since it was alleged that the federal government had violated
the plaintiff's right to equal protection, Frontiero was decided upon the due process
clause of the fifth amendment because the fourteenth amendment's limitations apply
only to the states. However, as the High Court has noted, although the fifth amend-
ment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is "so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id. at 680 n.5, quoting Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) ; see Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974),
wherein the Court observed that the fifth amendment imposes the same equal pro-
tection standards upon the federal government as the fourteenth amendment imposes
upon the states. Id. at 364-65 n.4.
COMMENTS
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classifications based upon sex were inherently suspect and must be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny,2 4 which is the applicable standard whenever a
fundamental right25 or a suspect classification2 6 is involved in a case, and
which requires the state to demonstrate that the classification is necessary
to advance a compelling state interest and that it is the only means of
doing so.27
Although its impact was diminished by the fact that only a plurality
of the Court joined in declaring gender to be a suspect classification, 28
Frontiero, together with Reed, appeared to indicate that laws "premised
upon overbroad generalizations"2 9 concerning the nature of the sexes
24. 411 U.S. at 686-87. Justice Brennan, author of the plurality opinion, ex-
plained the decision as follows:
[S]ince sex, like race and national, origin, is an immutable characteristic deter-
mined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon
the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 'the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility . . . .' And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect
statutes as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized
suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform . . . . As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often
have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior
legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.
Id., quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (emphasis
added).
Only a plurality of the Court - Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and
White - joined in declaring sex a suspect classification. Justice Stewart, citing Reed,
concurred in a one-sentence opinion. Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices
Powell and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger also found that Reed was sufficient
authority to support the result in Frontiero, and argued that it was unnecessary for
the Court to go any further, especially in light of the ongoing ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment among the states "which, if adopted will resolve this precise
question." 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). For further discussion of the
potential impact of the Equal Rights Amendment, see note 202 infra.
25. A fundamental right is one either implicitly or explicitly protected by the
Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34
(1972) ; see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Electors, 383 U.S. 663, 667-70 (1966) (the
right to vote is a fundamental right) ; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (reproductive
freedom and the right to privacy are fundamental rights) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (the right to travel is a fundamental right).
26. The suspect class concept evolved in the adjudication of suits involving racial
discrimination. Any classification based upon race has been held to be automatically
suspect, with the burden upon the state to demonstrate that the distinction was neces-
sary to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest in the sense that no other
classification would serve the purpose. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1965). National ancestry and alienage have also been designated as suspect
classifications. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
27. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969). The state must demonstrate that there were no alternative means
available to accomplish the legitimate objective, and that the classification was drawn
as narrowly as possible. Id.
28. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975); Vorcheimer v. School
Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 8M6 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976)
(No. 7637).
29. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1975). In Reed, the generaliza-
tion presumably was that women were less competent and less interested in admin-
istering estates than men. In Frontiero, the statutory scheme presumed that women
were, by and large, totally dependent upon their husbands for support. Incidentally,
this assumption was not borne out by the evidence. See 411 U.S. at 688-90.
[VOL. 21
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would no longer be subject to minimum scrutiny, but would fall under the
new standard of review being applied. The emerging standard emphasized
the importance of making benefits available to all citizens upon the basis
of individual capabilities, rather than upon stereotyped judgments em-
ployed for the convenience of the administrator.
Whatever light Reed and Frontiero had shed upon the standard of
review by which sex-based classifications were to be judged was dimmed
by Kahn v. Shevin,3 0 and nearly extinguished by Geduldig v. Aiello31
and Schlesinger v. Ballard.32 Kahn involved a Florida statute providing
a $500 property exemption for widows, but no corresponding exemption
for widowers. The Court relied upon Reed in upholding the law against
an equal protection challenge.3 3 The different treatment allotted to widows
and widowers was found to rest upon a ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation 34 - cushioning
"the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss im-
poses a disproportionately heavy burden."85 The Kahn Court appeared to
create an exception for sex-based laws which can survive the Reed test
because the object of the legislation was to benefit women. 36
The Kahn decision arguably represented a retreat from the positions
taken in Reed and Frontiero.7 If sex is a suspect classification, a gender-
based law can survive only if a compelling state interest can be demon-
strated to justify its existence. Assuming, arguendo, that remedying effects
of past economic discrimination is a compelling state interest, Florida's
property exemption for widows should nonetheless have been adjudged
unconstitutional because it is overinclusive in granting benefits to those
women who have never suffered the injury of economic discrimination.
Such overclassification by sex is unjust and, moreover, is redolent of the
administrative convenience rationale rejected by the Court in Reed and
Frontierd.s8 If, however, sex is not a suspect class and middle level
30.. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
31. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
32. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
33. 416 U.S. at 352.
34. Id. at 355-56.
35. Id. at 355.
36. It is interesting to note that even though Mr. Justice Douglas, author of the
Kahn opinion, joined the Frontiero plurality in declaring sex a suspect class, he made
no mention of sex as a suspect classification in Kahn. Frontiero was distinguished
on the ground that the law therein discriminated against women "solely for administra-
tive convenience." 416 U.S. at 355 (emphasis supplied by court). Mr. Justice Douglas
implied that Frontiero itself had carved out an exception for statutes "designed to
rectify the effects of past discrimination against women." 416 U.S. at 355 n.8. Another
distinction between Frontiero and Kahn was found in the fact that the latter case
involved a classification for purposes of taxation. The Court stated:
A state tax law is not arbitrary although it "discriminate [s] in favor of a certain
class . . . if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, a difference
in state policy," not in conflict with the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 355, quoting Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
37. See 416 U.S. at 357-360 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 360-62 (White, J., dis-
senting).
38. 416 U.S. at 355 & n.8.
COMMENTS
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scrutiny is to be applied, it is nevertheless difficult to see how a $500
property exemption for all widows bears a substantial relation to the
statutory purpose of remedying past economic discrimination. 39 Regard-
less of the standard of review being applied, two things seemed clear after
Kahn: 1) sex was not a suspect classification, and 2) classifications based
upon gender would withstand the fair and substantial relation test, pro-
vided the object of the legislation could be construed as beneficial to women.
The question of what constitutes a gender-based classification became
obscured in Geduldig v. Aiello,40 which involved a challenge to California's
disability insurance system.41 Along with drug addiction, dipsomania, and
sexual psychopathology, normal pregnancy was among the disabilities
excluded from coverage under the state system.42 The Court, applying
minimum scrutiny rather than the middle level scrutiny of Reed, upheld the
pregnancy exclusion against an equal protection attack, stating that if, in
the case of social welfare programs, a rational basis for the "line drawn
by the State" could be found, the courts would not intervene. 43 The Court
found California's policy decision to keep contributions low while providing
adequate coverage for those risks that were included to be a sufficient
justification for excluding normal pregnancy, which, if included, would
force an increase in the cost of employee contributions.44 Significantly,
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, stated that no gender-based
classification was involved 45 since the California plan divided participants
into two groups -- pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. 46
39. See id. at 352 & n.1; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202 (Supp. 1974-75). Because
Florida had provided the exemption for widows since 1885, it is doubtful that the
legislative object was to remedy the effects of past economic discrimination against
women. Rather, the motive was probably protective and paternalistic in nature. See id.
40. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
41. Id. at 487-89.
42. Id. at 488-89. It should be noted that the statute in Geduldig had been inter-
preted by the California state courts to cover disabilities resulting from abnormal
pregnancy. Id. at 490.
43. Id. at 495. The court relied upon three cases in which minimum scrutiny was
used and the statutory classifications upheld. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972) ; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
384 U.S. 483 (1955).
44. 417 U.S. at 495-96.
45. Id. at 496-97 & n.20. The court rationalized its findings that the statutory
scheme did not employ a sex-based classification as follows:
[T]his case is thus a far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed . . . and Frontiero v.
Richardson ... involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California
insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of
gender but merely removes one physical condition - pregnancy - from the list
of compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant,
it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex based classification.
The new program divides potential recipients into two groups - pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the
program thus accrue to members of both sexes.
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Gedulig's deviation from Reed and Frontiero cannot be fitted into
the special category for laws benefitting women created by Kahn.4 7 It is
true, as the Court noted, that not all women will become pregnant, but
neither will all men undergo prostectomies, a procedure covered by the
California plan.48 Pregnancy is gender linked, and the Geduldig Court
seemingly approved a double standard by upholding a statutory scheme
that excluded a medical condition affecting women only, while extending
coverage to ailments afflicting solely, or primarily, men.49
Schlesinger v. Ballard"0 further confused the question of when the
Court would find that men and women were similarly situated - a pre-
requisite to a finding of discrimination. 51 In Schlesinger, the petitioner
challenged the Navy's separation statutes which permitted men to serve for
10 years before mandatory separation for want of promotion, while women
were entitled to serve for 13 years before such separation was required. 2
The Court found that, because men and women were not similarly situated
with regard to opportunities for professional advancement, Congress could
rationally accord different treatment to women as compensation for the
deprivation of equal opportunity to compile service records comparable to
those of male officers. 53 No inquiry into the validity of the deprivation
was made. The Court approved discrimination against men in the tenure
statutes to compensate for discrimination against women during the period
of tenure. 54 It is unclear what standard of review was used in Schlesinger,
47. It is difficult to reconcile the Geduldig decision with Kahn, where a direct
benefit inured to all women, since in Geduldig women who experienced normal preg-
nancy and childbirth were not entitled to collect payments from a fund to which they
had contributed during their working years. See id. at 487-89.
48. Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
51. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 11. The same authors have observed:
The Constitution does not require that things different in fact be treated in law
as though they were the same. But it does require ... that those who are similarly
situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a classification
is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated.
TUSSMAN & TENBROEK, SELECTED ESSAYS 1938-62, at 789 (1963).
52. 419 U.S. at 499-500. The plaintiff premised his suit upon a denial of due
process under the fifth amendment. As in Frontiero, the Court applied an equal pro-
tection analysis. 419 U.S. at 500 n.3; see note 23 supra. In Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975), which involved another due process challenge to a sex-based
law, the Court observed: "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection
claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 638 n.2 (citations omitted).
53. 419 U.S. at 508. The statutory scheme forbade the assignment of women to
duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions and any naval vessels other than hospital
ships and transports; therefore, the Court found that their opportunities for advance-
ment were limited. Id. at 508, citing 10 U.S.C. § 5015 (1970).
54. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Schlesinger, criticized the Court's failure to
acknowledge the existence of the underlying discrimination. 419 U.S. at 511-12 n.1
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that the restrictions upon women
officers' opportunities for service had not been attacked, but observed that the Court
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but if one concludes that the Reed test 55 was employed, that test had been
diluted almost beyond recognition. If the object of the longer tenure was
to give women officers "fair and equitable career advancement programs,"
56
it is difficult to understand how this goal was fairly and substantially
promoted by providing women an additional 3 years to serve on hospital
ships instead of giving them an equal opportunity to compete with men for
promotion.
5 7
The two sex discrimination decisions subsequent to Schlesinger marked
a return to the middle level standard of review. In Weinberger v. Weisen-
feld,55 the Court voided a provision of the Social Security Act which
granted benefits to widows with children but denied them to widowers.5 9
The statute was found to be based upon an "archaic and overbroad
generalization" 60 which, contrary to the argument advanced by the govern-
ment, injured women rather than benefitted them.61
55. Reed and Frontiero were distinguished by the Schlesinger Court as involving
statutory classifications based upon "archaic and overbroad generalizations" employed
solely for administrative convenience. 419 U.S. at 507. It was not explained why the
exclusion of women officers from combat duty was not an archaic and overbroad
generalization.
56. 419 U.S. at 508, quoting H.R. REP. No. 216, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1967).
57. Clearly, Schlesinger can be reconciled with Kahn in that the Court perceived
both statutory schemes as granting benefits to women in order to compensate for past
inequities. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
58. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Weinberger was decided on the basis of the equal
protection guarantee of the fifth amendment's due process clause. Id. at 638 n.2; see
notes 25 & 52 supra.
59. 420 U.S. at 643-44. Section 202 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)
(Supp. V, 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), made benefits based upon
earnings of a deceased husband and father payable to the widow and the couple's
minor children in her care. Benefits based on the earnings of a deceased wife and
mother, however, were payable only to the minor children. Id. § 402(d). The plaintiff,
a widower, was unable to collect Social Security survivor's benefits which, had he
been a woman, would have enabled him to receive the same dollar amount in benefits
as his child received while he remained at home to care for the child. See id.
§§ 402(d)(2), (g)(2). If a widowed mother elected to go to work, the amount of
benefits was reduced $1 for every $2 earned annually above $2400. Id. §§ 403(b), (f).
60. 420 U.S. at 644-45. The "archiac and overbroad generalization" underlying
the sex-based classification embodied in the Social Security Act was that the earnings
of the male are vital to the family's support, while those of a woman are not. Id. The
Court noted that although the assumption was not without empirical support, it did
not justify the deprivation of benefits with respect to survivors of women whose earn-
ings contributed significantly to the support of their families. Id.
61. The Government, relying upon Kahn, argued that section 402(g) was de-
signed to compensate women for past economic discrimination. 420 U.S. at 648.
However, the Court noted that the legislative history of section 402(g) indicated that
Congress intended to make it economically feasible for women to remain at home
with their children - a choice women, but not men, would presumably make. See
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 1937 FINAL REPORT 31; ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORTS ON THE OLD AGE, SURVIVORS, AND DISABILITY INSUR-
ANCE AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS 30 (1971).
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In Stanton v. Stantdn,612 the Court struck down a Utah law which
specified a greater age of majority for males than for females. 3 Mr.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, found it "unnecessary to decide
whether a classification based upon sex is inherently suspect" 64 because
this particular classification could not stand under any test - rational
relation, compelling state interest, or "something in between." 65 The Court
found that the classification violated the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of equal protection because it imposed "criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of the statute." 66
Any attempt to analyze the line of decisions from Reed to Stanton
produces, as one court remarked, "an uncomfortable feeling, somewhat
similar to a man playing a shell game, who is not absolutely sure there is
a pea."'67 Still, some conclusions can be reached. First, even though a
majority of the Supreme Court has declined to view sex as a suspect
classification,68 the Court has approved a stricter standard of review for
testing the validity of gender-based classifications. 69 The purpose and
effect of the legislation at issue is examined, and if the Court finds that
the purpose was premised upon an archaic and overbroad generalization
concerning the nature of the sexes, the statute will probably be struck
down,70 unless it can be demonstrated that the effect of the statute is
remedial. 71 If the effect of the classification was to deny to women a
benefit which has been extended to men, the statute will most likely be
struck down,72 unless the Government can demonstrate that a cost increase
of considerable proportions would result from extension of the benefit. 73
62. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
63. Id. at 13-17. Under the challenged statute, the age of majority for females
was set at 18 while for males it was 21. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953). The
case arose in the context of an action for support which the plaintiff brought against
her former husband when he ceased making child support payments after his daughter
reached age 18. 421 U.S. at 9.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Id. at 17.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1976)
(No. 76-37). The district court opinion by Judge Newcomer contains an excellent
analysis of the Supreme Court's sex discrimination decisions.
68. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) ; notes 36 & 64 and accompanying
text supra.
69. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) ; notes 15-20 and accompanying text
supra.
70. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) ; Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 642-43 (1975) ; notes 19 & 58-66 and accompanying text supra.
71. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) ; Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 355 & n.8 (1974) ; notes 38 & 61 and accompanying text supra.
72. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
75 (1971).
73. See notes 38-47 and accompanying text supra.
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If this can be shown, and the Court can style the legislation as economic
or social in nature, then the plaintiff must contend with the possibility
that minimum scrutiny will be applied and the classification upheld. 74
In any event, two threads running through the series of Supreme Court
cases dealing with sex discrimination which emphasizes a definite change
in judicial attitude may be detected: 1) the Court's willingness to brush
aside "archaic and overbroad" generalizations about women's nature, in-
terests, and needs,75 and 2) the emphasis upon granting benefits based
upon an evaluation of individual capacity.76
III. SEX )ISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETICS: THE THRILL OF
VICTORY AND THE AGONY OF DEFEAT
A. Recent Decisions
Although a relatively recent phenomenon,7 7 suits challenging restric-
tions placed upon the participation of women in sports are increasing in
number and "may be the best illustration of female impatience with
women's place."' 78 Most of the suits have been premised upon the theory
74. See id.
75. See notes 55 & 60 supra.
76. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) ; notes 17-20 and accompanying text
supra.
The emphasis in Reed upon the importance of the individual's capacity to
perform has also surfaced in recent Supreme Court sex discrimination cases decided
under the due process theory. The statutory classifications in Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), were
both invalidated because they employed irrebuttable presumptions concerning the sex-
based classifications involved, which destroyed the very purpose of the legislation. In
Stanley, the statute presumed that an unwed father was an unfit parent who, if the
mother were deceased, would not be entitled to custody of the couple's children. 405
U.S. at 646. The legislative purpose was to promote the best welfare of the children,
but no opportunity was provided the unwed father to show that the children's welfare
would be promoted by remaining in his care. Id. at 652-55.
In LaFleur, mandatory maternity leaves for schoolteachers were intended to
protect the pregnant teacher's health and to maintain good classroom performance. 414
U.S. at 640-41. The presumption was that all pregnant teachers became physically
unable to perform their duties at a certain designated point of pregnancy. Id. at
644. There was no examination of an individual teacher's health, and no opportunity
was given her to demonstrate that she could continue to teach. Id. Moreover, under
the rules, a teacher could be forced to leave in midyear, which could be detrimental
to her students. Id. at 643.
The irrebuttable presumptions doctrine is a potent weapon that is employed by
the Court only when the presumption places a burden upon a constitutionally protected
right. Id. at 652 (Powell, J., concurring) 657-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. The few suits concerning sex discrimination in athletics brought prior to 1970
involved challenges by professional female athletes to the failure of the state sports
commissions to issue licenses to them. See Hesseltine v. State Athletic Comm'n, 6
Ill. App. 2d 129, 126 N.E.2d 631 (1955) ; Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 App. Div. 2d 152, 286
N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ; State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956).
78. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 1020 (1975). The reason for female impatience becomes apparent when
some of the challenged restrictions against women in athletics are inspected. The
typical restrictions followed a similar pattern: a prohibition against teams composed
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that the segregation of athletic teams by sex violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 79
In deciding cases which have challenged sex-based restrictions in
athletics, courts have focused upon the following four factors: 1) whether
the plaintiffs were totally denied the opportunity to take part in a
particular sport;80 2) the appropriate standard of review;81 3) whether
of members of both sexes coupled with a prohibition of competition between men's
and women's teams. For example, in Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F.
Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973), the court dealt
with the following regulation:
"Girls shall be prohibited from participation in the boys' interscholastic athletic
program either as a member of the boys' team or a member of the girls' team
playing the boys' team. The girls' team shall not accept male members."
Id. at 1227, quoting MINNESOTA STATE HIGH SCHOOL LEAGUE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK,
1971-72, Athletic Rules for Girls, Article III, Section 5. The court in Bucha v.
Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972), was confronted by the
following school athletic rule:
"No school belonging to this Association shall permit girls to participate in inter-
scholastic athletic contests with the following specific exceptions: Interscholastic
contests in archery, badminton, bowling, fencing, golf, gymnastics, swimming,
tennis and track and field may be permitted, and sports days may be held in
basketball, field hockey, soccer, softball and volleyball provided: that each sport
included in sports days is taught by a girls' physical education teacher as part
of the girls' physical education curriculum and intramural programs; that no girl
shall participate in more than one sport at any sports day; that no school shall
be permitted to enter girls in more than four sports days in the same sport during
a school year ......
Id. at 71 n.1, quoting Bylaw A-II-14 of the Illinois High School Association. Other
restrictions which the Illinois High School Association thought necessary for women
included a prohibition on organized cheering, a $1 limit on the value of awards, and
a prohibition of overnight trips. 351 F. Supp. at 71 n.2. For examples of similar
restrictions, see Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207, 1208 (6th Cir.
1973) ; Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1236
(D. Kan. 1974) ; Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D.
Neb. 1972) ; Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 521-22, 289
N.E.2d 495, 498 (1972).
79. Since the actions were filed by public school students against their schools,
school districts, and/or statewide school athletic associations, the requisite finding of
state action presented little problem. The fourteenth amendment, as implemented by
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), furnishes the
basis of a claim for relief only if the rule or practice in issue is found to be state
action or action under color of state law. Voluntary school associations have been
found to act under color of state law since their existence is dependent upon partici-
pation of the public schools, which are tax-supported institutions. See Mitchell v.
Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Oklahoma
High School Ass'n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Bucha v. Illinois High
School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972) ; Equality in Athletics, supra note 5,
at 430-31. The Little League organization has been found to act under color of state
law. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 346-48 (1st Cir.
1975). The only authorities holding that voluntary school associations do not act under
color of state law are Kelly v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 367 F. Supp.
1388 (E.D. Wis. 1974), and Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp.
1212 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
80. See notes 85-102 and accompanying text infra.
81. See notes 109-13 and accompanying text infra.
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the sport was one involving physical contact ;82 and 4) the type of evidence
to be considered.83
In general, equal protection claims have arisen in two factual situa-
tions. First is the complete failure of a school to fund a particular team
for its women students, while at the same time prohibiting women from
joining the corresponding men's team.8 4 Under such circumstances, most
courts have found a fourteenth amendment violation. The issue in these
cases was not whether a woman has a constitutional right to participate in
a particular sport,8 5 but whether the state, having provided an athletic
program, can deny an opportunity for equal participation to members of
one sex.8 6 The state cannot do so unless it offers8 7 a reason for the sex-
based restriction which the court is willing to accept.8 8 Applying the middle
82. See notes 114-17 and accompanying text infra.
83. See notes 100 & 128 and accompanying text infra. Other factors which have
influenced the outcome of some suits were whether the case was filed in class action
form and whether the passage of time mooted the case so far as the plaintiff was con-
cerned. In Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973), the
court ruled that the plaintiff's graduation from high school had mooted the case as to
her and barred her from representing the class. Id. at 931. The court added that the
requirements of rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not been met;
it was unclear whether the class consisted of women participating in interscholastic
sports contests or those who would do so only if they could compete with males. The
court expressed doubt that there was a class at all, and noted a lack of evidence
demonstrating that other women students believed that their constitutional rights
had been infringed by the defendant's rule requiring sex-segregated athletic teams
in all sports. Id. But cf. Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Snpp. 69, 71-72
(N.D. Ill. 1972), wherein plaintiff was permitted to represent a class consisting both
of females of exceptional athletic ability who might wish to compete against men,
and females who might wish to participate in programs separate from but equal to
those provided for men. See also Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 342 F.
Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973). Both the district
and the circuit courts were careful to point out that the suit was not a class action, and
emphasized that the relief granted - ordering admission of the two plaintiffs to the
formerly all-male cross country and skiing teams - applied only to the plaintiffs,
both of whom were exceptional athletes. Id. at 1231-32; 477 F.2d at 1301-02.
84. See, e.g., Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 523,
289 N.E.2d 495, 499 (1972).
85. In State ex rel. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Lawrence, 240 Ind.
114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1969), the court stated that "the right of the plaintiffs to go to
public schools and receive education and training cannot properly be said to include
interscholastic sports and games." Id. at 124, 162 N.E.2d at 255. See also Brenden v.
Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1297 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Gilpin v. Kansas State
High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1240-41 (D. Kan. 1974).
86. See Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258, 262 (D. Neb.
1972) ; Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 521-26, 289 N.E.2d
495, 498-501 (1972).
87. The burden of proof has been placed on the defendants in these cases to
demonstrate that the classification bears a substantial relation to a legitimate state
purpose. See Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233,
1242 (D. Kan. 1974) ; Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224, 1232-33,
aff'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341
F. Supp. 258, 261 (D. Neb. 1972); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp.,
259 Ind. 515, 522-23, 289 N.E.2d 495, 498-99 (1972).
88. A holding that the fourteenth amendment had not been violated could also
result if the court found that the men and women students were not similarly situated.
Such has been held when sex segregation in contact sports was being challenged. See
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level scrutiny standard of review articulated in Reed v. Reed,8 9 the courts
have rejected justifications for sex discrimination in athletic programs
which would have been sufficient had a lower level of scrutiny been ap-
plied.90 Upon examining and weighing the character of the classification,
the individual interests affected thereby, and the governmental interests
asserted in support thereof,91 the courts have rejected: 1) the state's fiscal
interest in providing only one all-male team, offered as a defense in Reed
v. Nebraska Scho,ol Activities Association92 and Haas v. South Bend
Community School Corp. ;93 2) the argument that participation in athletics
is a privilege and not a right, advanced by the defendants in Brenden v.
Independent School District 74294 and Gilpin v. Kansas State High School
Activities Association;95 3) the administrative convenience rationale,
pressed in Gilpin; and 4) an asserted protective purpose in maintaining
sex segregation in athletics, urged by the defendants in Haas9" and
BrendenY7 This asserted protective purpose in maintaining separate teams
was premised upon the conclusion that women cannot compete effectively
Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) ; Haas v. South
Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 522-23, 289 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1972).
The courts have assumed that women are incapable of competing on an equal basis
with men in contact sports such as hockey, wrestling, and football; but if the suit is
not a class action and if the plaintiff has demonstrated her ability to compete, it would
seem that a rule prohibiting women from competing would have to be found to dis-
criminate against that particular plaintiff. The argument becomes even stronger when
all men are permitted to participate on the team regardless of athletic ability, but
no women are admitted despite demonstrated athletic excellence. See Gilpin v. Kansas
State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1241 (D. Kan. 1974). For
a further discussion of sex segregation in contact sports, see notes 114-17 and
accompanying text infra.
89. For an analysis of Reed v. Reed, see notes 15-21 and accompanying text
supra.
90. See notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text supra.
91. Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1239
(D. Kan. 1974), quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
92. 341 F. Supp. 258, 262-63 (D. Neb. 1972). The court noted that the association
had presented no evidence of a cost increase, but had merely presented the conclusion
that permitting the plaintiff to participate on the all-male team would be too costly.
Id. The implication of Reed was that if a material cost increase could be shown, the
sex segregation might be upheld.
93. 259 Ind. 515, 525, 289 N.E.2d 495, 500 (1972). In Haas, the defendant school
offered no concrete evidence on the cost factor. The court noted that its decision
would not require the defendant to expand existing programs or to implement new
ones. Id.; cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) ; notes 40-59 and accompanying
text supra.
94. 477 F.2d 1292, 1297 (8th Cir. 1973).
95. 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1240-41 (D. Kan. 1974). See also Reed v. Nebraska High
School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258, 262 (D. Neb. 1972). The privilege/right
argument is actually procedural in nature; if no constitutional right has been infringed,
there is no cause of action under section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). While the
courts have agreed that participation in interscholastic sports is not a constitutional
right, they have framed the question to be whether female students can be denied the
benefit of participating in activities available to male students solely because of sex.
Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1297 (1973).
96. 259 Ind. at 522-24, 289 N.E.2d at 498-500.
97. 342 F. Supp. at 1233.
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with men in sports because of the inherent physical differences between
the sexes; thus, it: was argued, separate teams were reasonable, indeed,
necessary. Several courts accepted this conclusion,9 8 but held, neverthe-
less, that they could not sanction a failure to provide any athletic program
for women. 9 This was especially true in view of the school's asserted
purpose in maintaining interscholastic athletics, which was to "provide
students with the opportunity to cultivate good mental habits and to develop
their physical abilities."' 00 The appellation "student" presumably includes
members of both sexes, and any argument that women have less of a need
to develop their physical and mental abilities than do men is redolent of
the sort of sex stereotyping condemned by the Supreme Court.1 1
As demonstrated by the preceding decisions, the situation in which
the plaintiff was faced with the alternatives of either gaining admission to
the men's team or not taking part in a particular sport at all gave the
courts relatively little difficulty.' 0 2 A more difficult problem was presented
by the second type of factual situation - where a separate program for
women did exist, but the plaintiff wished either to gain entry to the men's
team or to invalidate restrictions on competition between the separate
teams. In Bucha v. Illinois High School Association,10 3 plaintiffs sought
to do both. They had access to an athletic program which featured a swim-
ming team, the activity of special interest to them, but it was subject to
restrictions not placed upon the men's team.' 0 4 Plaintiffs asserted that the
98. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224, 1242-43 (D. Minn.
1972) ; Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 522-24, 289 N.E.2d
495, 498-500 (1972).
99. E.g., Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233,
1242 (D. Kan. 1974).
100. See, e.g., the oft-cited language of Judge Lord, writing for the court in
Brenden:
There are, of course, substantial physiological differences between males and
females. As testified to by defendant's expert witnesses, men are taller than
women, stronger than women by reason of a greater muscle mass; have larger
hearts than women and a deeper breathing capacity, enabling them to utilize
oxygen more efficiently than women, run faster, based upon the construction of
the pelvic area, which, when women reach puberty, widens, causing the femur to
bend outward, rendering the female incapable of running as efficiently as a
male. These physiological differences may, on the average, prevent the great
majority of women from competing on an equal level with the great majority of
males. The differences may form a basis for defining class competition on the
basis of sex, for the purpose of encouraging girls to compete in their own class
and not in a class consisting of boys ....
342 F. Supp. at 1233. Compare the evidence accepted by the court of appeals in Fortin
v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 348-51 (1st Cir. 1975), with the
conclusion reached by Wilmore, Inferiority of Female Athletes: Myth or Reality, 3
JOURNAL OF SPORTS MEDICINE 1, 5-6 (1975).
101. See notes 29 & 60 and accompanying text supra.
102. See Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233
(D. Kan. 1974) ; Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn.
1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Reed v. Nebraska School Activities
Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972); Haas v. South Bend Community School
Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972).
103. 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
104. For the text of the regulation involved in Bucha, see note 78 supra.
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women's contests were "purposely conducted in a manner that emphasizes
the intramural, multisport activities which are devoid of the concentration
and competitive emphasis that is characteristic of boys' extracurricular
sports."'' 5  The complaint was dismissed on a motion for summary
judgment, with the defendant conceding, and the court noting, that there
existed real differences between the two programs' 0 6 which made them
separate and unequal. The court found the sex-based classification and
the disproportionate treatment to be rational because "the 14th amendment
does not create a fictitious equality where there is a real difference." 0 7
Great emphasis was placed upon the fact that women did have their own
program.' 08
The difference in outcome between Bucha and the Haas, Reed v.
Nebraska, Brenden, and Gilpin quartet of decisions can be explained'0 9 by
two factors. First, the Bucha plaintiffs could swim in their own pool,
so to speak, even though the complaint was that the pool was too shallow,
while the plaintiffs in the latter cases did not even have this dubious ad-
vantage. Second, the Bucha court applied a different standard of review
than that applied by the courts in the Haas quartet. The Bucha court
opined that Reed v. Reed had utilized minimum scrutiny,110 so that only a
rational, not a fair and substantial, relation between the purpose of the
program and the classification needed to be shown. Haas and subsequent
cases viewed Reed as mandating the application of a more stringent standard
of review to the school's justifications for the differences in treatment
between the sexes."1
The appellate court in Morris v. Michigan State Board of Education112
concurred with the Bucha court's opinion that Reed represented nothing
more than an application of minimum scrutiny to a sex-based classifica-
tion."1 Nevertheless, the court found that standard sufficient to compel
it to affirm the district court's issuance of a temporary injunction prohibiting
the exclusion of women from varsity interscholastic athletics - with one
105. 351 F. Supp. at 71.
106. Id. at 72, 74.
107. Id. at 74, quoting Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912). The
court was convinced that there was a "real difference" in the athletic abilities of men
and women because not only were the men's times in each Olympic event better than
those of women, but because the two male swimmers whom Hinsdale, Illinois sent to
the state championship contest scored better than either of the female plaintiffs ever
had. 351 F. Supp. at 74. The Bucha court also cited the language of Brenden (see
note 100 supra) as evidence of the difference in athletic prowess between the sexes.
Id. at 74-75 n.3. Conflicting evidence introduced by the plaintiffs justified the exercise
of judicial restraint since, the court stated, the experts disagreed. Id. at 75.
108. Id. at 74-75.
109. For a comparison of Bucha with Reed v. Nebraska, Brenden, and Haas, see
50 CHI. KENT L. REV. 169 (1973).
110. 351 F. Supp. at 74.
111. 351 F. Supp. at 74; see note 17 supra. Most courts and commentators have
viewed Reed as announcing a stricter standard of review than that found under the
rational relation test. See, e.g., note 109 supra. See generally Gunther, supra note 14.
112. 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973).
113. Id. at 1209; see note 17 supra.
COM MENTS :'
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss5/4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
exception. The lower court had banned sex segregation in athletics
generally, but the court of appeals modified the order, making it applicable
to noncontact sports only." 4 The Morris decision illustrates the dichotomy
in treatment accorded contact sports and noncontact sports, even when
sex segregation means that women will be unable to participate in the
particular sport because the school does not provide a team for them.
This dichotomy has been carried over from case law into section 86.41
of the Title IX regulations.11
B. The Little League Cases: Women on First
Baseball has traditionally been considered a contact sport," 6 necessi-
tating separate teams for boys and girls.1 17 In 1964, Congress, in order
to teach young men appropriate values, conferred federal corporation
status upon the Little League organization.1 s The objectives of the
corporation were defined as follows:
114. Id. After the preliminary injunction had been entered, and perhaps because
of it, the Michigan legislature enacted the following law:
Female pupils shall be permitted to participate in all noncontact interscholastic
athletic activities . . . . Even if the institution does have a girls' team in any
noncontact interscholastic athletic activity, the female shall be permitted to com-
pete for a position on the boys' team. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed
to prevent or interfere with the selection of competing teams on the basis of
athletic ability.
Id., citing Micn. Cov. LAws ANN. § 340.379(2) (1972). The passage of the law
did not compel the court of appeals decision in Morris because the law did not become
effective until after the decision had been handed down. 472 F.2d at 1209.
115. 40 Fed. Reg. 24142-43 (1975) ; see notes 146-49 and accompanying text infra.
116. See, e.g., Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D.
Pa. 1973), wherein the court took judicial notice that baseball is a contact sport. Id.
Id. at 1216.
117. In Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa.
1973), the court accepted evidence indicating that girls should not participate in the
same Little League team with boys. The court stated:
[Y]oung girls would be endangered physically if allowed to compete with the
boys in organized baseball and . . . to permit the girls to compete would destroy
the program already underway because the boys would drop out....
The directors have had a great deal of experience with boy's baseball and
have formed the opinion after mature consideration that girls would not fare well
in physical contact with the boys. They admit that there are excellent girl athletes
but contend that they should not be placed in physical contact with boys.
Id. at 1216.
118. Act of July 16, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-378, 78 Stat. 325. For a statement of
some of the reasons for the granting of the federal charter, see S. REP. No. 1154,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964). The Senate report stated:
Over a period of years, the Little League Baseball Organization has done
a great deal to achieve widespread participation by American youth in the tradi-
tional game of baseball. Its program has done much to encourage physical fitness,
to teach the value of team play, and to instill the spirit of sportsmanship.
[lit is estimated that 1.25 million boys participate annually in Little League
baseball. ...
The committee believes that the granting of a Federal charter would be
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(1) To promote . . . and . . . assist the interest of boys who will
participate in Little League baseball.
(2) To help ... boys in developing qualities of citizenship, sportman-
ship and manhood.
(3) Using the disciplines of the native American game of baseball,
to teach spirit and competitive will to win, physical fitness through
individual sacrifice, the values of teamplay and wholesome well-being
through healthful association with other youngsters under proper
leadership. 119
Ten years and 22 class actions later,'120 Congress amended the Little
League Corporation charter to require that both girls and boys be given
the opportunity to participate in the League.1 2 1 The congressional hearings
emphasized the legislative intent that the Little League not establish
separate programs for males and females, but integrate females into the
existing programs on an equal basis. 122
Despite a congressional mandate to the contrary, potential female
Little Leaguers continued to encounter resistance on the local level, as
illustrated in Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc. 12 3 In Fortin, the
district court upheld the defendant-organization's refusal to admit the
plaintiff to its ranks.124 Prior to plaintiff's appeal of that decision, the
Little League's charter was amended to require admission of females, but,
notwithstanding this development, the defendant continued to balk.' 25
Relying upon its interpretation of the Supreme Court's sex discrimination
decisions and the recent change in the Little League charter, the First
Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the League had met
its burden of proving that there was a convincing reason, apart from
convention, for the sex segregation of youngsters between 8 and 12 years
of age who wanted to play baseball. 1 26 The impact of Fortin was diluted by
the court's limitation of its holding to girls between 8 and 12 years of age,
and by its acceptance of the assumption that the differences in athletic
abilities of the sexes increase as children mature.127 The decision is
119. Act of July 16, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-378, 78 Stat. 325 (emphasis added).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 1409, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). In National
Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318
A.2d 33 (App. Div. 1974), a case which was decided prior to the amendment of the
Little League's national charter, plaintiffs overcame the exclusion of girls from
League activities by suing under a New Jersey statute which prohibited sex discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation. See Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-2(f) (Supp. 1975-76).
121. See 36 U.S.C. § 1073 (Supp. V, 1975), amending Pub. L. No. 88-378, 78
Stat. 325 (1964).
122. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
123. 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'g 376 F. Supp. 472 (D.R.I. 1974).
124. 514 F.2d at 346.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 351.
127. Id. Judge Campbell, writing for the Fortin court, stated:
Central to our decision, of course, are such factors as the ages of the children
concerned, the uniqueness of the opportunity, and recent congressional assessment
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significant nonetheless because of the court's close judicial scrutiny of the
evidence 28 and its prohibition of both separate but equal and separate
and unequal treatment of the sexes in a contact sport. Fortin has thus
gone further than any other decision to promote an end to sexism in
athletics. 129
IV. TITLE IX OF THE 1972 EDUCATION AMENDMENT:
BACK TO THE BENCH
A. Title IX
Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments'" (Title IX) prohibits
any educational program receiving federal financial assistance from dis-
criminating on the basis of sex.181 The sanction for noncompliance is
termination of federal aid to the specific educational entity which violated
the Act.' 3 2 The legislation follows a not unfamiliar statutory pattern -
that of a general rule followed by exceptions. 13 3 It is submitted, however,
of the situation. Nothing we say is meant to preclude recognition of bona fide
distinguishing factors between the sexes in some sports at some ages and in some
circumstances.
Id. While it is true that the Little League was open only to children of 12 years or
under, the Fortin court implied that the outcome might have been different had teen-
agers been involved. Id.
128. For a summary of the evidence offered at trial, see id. at 349. The court of
appeals noted that the evidence presented by the defendant's expert witness was
"entirely impressionistic" and pointed out that no reason had been given for the
rejection of the testimony of plaintiff's witness who was, the court implied, more
experienced in working with children. Id. at 350.
129. For further discussion of how Fortin extends beyond and conflicts with the
HEW regulation concerning contact sports, see notes 162-64 and accompanying text
infra.
130. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (Supp. V, 1975).
131. Section 901(a) of Title IX provides in part:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
Id. § 1681(a). This prohibition applies to "any public or private preschool, elementary
or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher educa-
tion ... " Id. § 1681(c).
132. Id. § 1682. There must be an express finding of noncompliance with an oppor-
tunity for a hearing. All measures to secure voluntary compliance must have been
exhausted prior to termination of funding. Id. The halt of aid is limited to the
particular entity found to be in violation of Title IX. Id. For a discussion of how
the sanctions of 'Title IX can be applied to athletic programs which do not directly
receive federal funds, see Preventing Sex Discrimination, supra note 1, at 107-13.
133. Section 901 (a) (3) of Title IX provides an exception for schools controlled
by religious organizations if Title IX's enforcement "would not be consistent with
the religious tenents of such organization . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (3) (Supp. V,
1975). Section 901 (a) (4) exempts schools whose "primary purpose is the training
of individuals for the military services . . . ." Id. § 1681 (a) (4). Section 1681(a) (5)
excepts any public undergraduate school which "traditionally and continually" has
admitted only students of one sex. Id. § 1681 (a) (5). Finally, section 1681(b)
eliminates the need for implementation of affirmative action programs to correct the
effects of past sex discrimination. Id. § 1681(b). For further discussion of Title IX
and the exceptions noted above, see Buek & Orleans, Sex Discrimination - A Bar to a
Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
6 CoNN. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1973).
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that the Title IX exceptions serve to undermine the stated purpose of the
legislation 34 rather than to define and further it.135 Although Title IX
was modeled, in some respects, upon Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,136 which prohibited racial discrimination in any federally assisted
program, 3 7 it "contains exemptions and deferments which enact into
law significant popular as well as judicial indecision"' 38 with regard to
sex discrimination which are not found in Title VI.
Title IX does not directly address the issue of sex bias in athletic
programs sponsored by the educational institutions within the statute's
purview. However, Congress authorized the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (HEW) to prepare regulations implementing the provi-
sions of Title IX,139 and specifically mentioned the need for "reasonable
provisions" governing intercollegiate athletic programs. 1 40
B. The HEW Regulations: Women Strike Out
On June 20, 1974, approximately 2 years after Title IX was enacted,
HEW issued proposed regulations for the statute's enforcement. 141 Sec-
tion 86.38 of the proposed regulations set out guidelines for the administra-
tion of athletic programs. 142 Responding to an invitation to comment, 143
134. See notes 133 supra & 136 infra.
135. See notes 130 supra & 136 infra.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1970). Title IX was originally introduced as an
amendment to Title VI, with the intent of closing the "gap in the laws protecting
women from biased educational policies," just as Title VI protected racial minorities
from discrimination. See Buek & Orleans, supra note 133, at 2 n.5.
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1970).
138. Buek & Orleans, supra note 133, at 3. The authors observed:
Legislatures and courts at all levels, reflecting views held in many parts of
American society, perceive sex discrimination as less onerous or less invidious
than discrimination based on race . . . . Thus, while Title VI reflects accept-
ance ... of the Supreme Court's holding . . . that 'separate [educational] facilities
are inherently unequal,' Title IX reflects a somewhat different concept. Specifi-
cally, it is now widely accepted that children should not be assigned to 'white'
school[s] or 'Negro' school[s], but to 'just schools.' Title IX, however, reflects
no such general acceptance that children should not be assigned to 'boys schools'
or 'girls schools,' but to 'just schools.'
Id. at 2-3, citing Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968), and
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970). See
also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. V, 1975).
140. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
141. 39 Fed. Reg. 22228-22240 (1974).
142. Id. at 22236. Section 86.38 would have permitted school systems to "operate
or sponsor" separate teams for members of each sex where selection was based upon
competitive skill. Proposed HEW Reg. § 86.38(a), 39 Fed. Reg. at 22236. Equality
in expenditures between the teams was not required. Id. § 86.38(f). There was a
provision for annual determination of student interest in various sports, id. § 86.38(b),
and a requirement that certain affirmative action programs be instituted. Id. § 86.38(c).
These last two provisions were deleted from the regulation in its final form. See
40 Fed. Reg. 24134 (1975).
143. See note 4 supra.
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various groups attacked the proposed regulation as either going too far 144
or not far enough, 145 but few changes were made. Adopted as section
86.41,146 the regulation contains a general prohibition against sex-based
discrimination in any school-sponsored athletic program.' 47  However,
section 86.41(b) creates an exception authorizing separate teams based
upon sex "where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill
or the activity involved is a contact sport. 1 48  Section 86.41(b) further
provides:
[W]here a recipient offers or sponsors a team in a noncontact sport
for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for
members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of
that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex
must be allowed to try out for the team offered unless the sport involved
is a contact sport.149
Section 86.41 (c) commands that recipients shall "provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes"' 50 and sets out a list of variables
to be considered in determining whether or not the equal opportunity
standard has been met. The variables include such items as the provision
of equipment and supplies, travel and per diem allowance, coaching, facilities,
and publicity.' 5 ' The regulation states, however, that unequal aggregate
expenditures for men and women or for sex-segregated teams does not
automatically constitute noncompliance with Title IX.152 Finally, elemen-
tary schools are granted 1 year to comply with the regulation while all
other schools are given.3 years.'5 3
144. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) argued that athletics
were not covered by Title IX at all because the programs received no federal financial
assistance. 1 WOMEN'S L. REP. 1.181 (1975). The Justice Department submitted a
legal opinion that athletics were indeed within the statute's purview. Id. The NCAA
then proposed that revenues earned by revenue producing intercollegiate sports be
exempted from coverage under the regulation, which proposal was rejected by HEW.
See 40 Fed. Reg. 24134 (1975).
145. Various women's rights advocates urged that the regulations be strengthened,
pointing out that the concept of separate but equal had no place in civil rights legisla-
tion, and that equal access to all was the proper rule. See 1 WOmENs' L. REP. 1.181
(1975).
146. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1975).
147. Id. Section 86.41 (a) provides:
,No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, be treated differently from any other person or otherwise be
discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intermural
athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics
separately on such basis.
Id. § 86.41 (a).
148. Id. § 86.41(b).
149. Id. (emphasis added). Contact sports were defined to "include boxing,
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports, the purpose or
major activity of which involves bodily contact." Id.
150. Id. § 86.41 (c).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 86.41(d).
896 [VOL. 21
21
Kutner: Sex Discrimination in Athletics
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976
1975-1976]
By way of summary, section 86.41 permits: 1) separate teams where
selection is based upon competitive skill; 2) separate and unequal teams
when the sport involved is a contact sport; and 3) the possible total
exclusion of women from participation in contact sports. It is submitted
that section 86.41 conflicts both with other civil rights legislation and with
the statement of congressional policy as expressed in the recently amended
Little League Corporation Act, and that it violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
1. Section 86.41 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The rationale of the section 86.41 (b) provision authorizing separate
teams based upon sex when the criterion for admission is competitive skill
is unclear. One commentator 154 has suggested that it was intended to
serve a function analogous to the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) clause found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII). 155 The BFOQ exception allows discrimination in hiring if
sex is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
business.156 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
has mandated that the BFOQ exception be interpreted narrowly'5 7 and
that it not be construed to permit the perpetuation of sexual stereotypes. 158
The EEOC guideline states:
The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be con-
sidered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of
any characteristics generally attributed to the group .... 159
By the terms of this provision, it is conceivable that a team using com-
petitive skill as a criterion for admission would use some objective standard
to measure its applicants. Assessment would be on an individual basis -
the sex of the applicant would be irrelevant and the only concern would
be the person's athletic ability. Section 86.41, however, appears to be
premised upon a viewpoint directly opposed to the EEOC interpretation
of the principle of nondiscrimination. Indeed, the section embodies the
154. Preventing Sex Discrimination, supra note 1, at 103.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). Title VII forbids discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Id. However,
section 703 (e) of Title VII provides an exception to the general ban on discriminatory
hiring practices for sex, religion and national origin, but not race, in the hiring of
employees where such criteria are "bona fide occupational qualificational qualifica-
tion[s] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise . . . ." Id. § 2000(e)-2(e).
156. See note 155 supra.
157. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1975).
158. Id. § 1604.2(a) (1).
159. Id. § 1604.1(a) (1) (ii). An onerous burden of proof has been placed upon
the employer to demonstrate the applicability of the BFOQ exception. For three
different interpretations of the BFOQ exception, see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co.,
444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) ; Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
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very assumption which the EEOC guidelines sought to invalidate. The
regulations assume, based upon a sexual stereotype, that no woman will
be able to meet whatever objective standard is set, and that at least some
men will. The objective of Title IX was to give women "an equal
chance ... to develop the skills they want, and to apply those skills .. -.160
However, the HEW regulations relegate women to an inferior level,
refusing to recognize the skills that some already possess and denying to
others the incentive to develop those talents. Although section 86.41
permits women to try out for a team where the criterion for admission
is competitive skill, when there is only one team and women have formerly
been deprived of equal opportunity in the sport, the right is limited to
noncontact sports. 161 Since the regulation contemplates two teams, the
more rational procedure would be to separate members of each on the
basis of ability rather than on the basis of sex, particularly in view of
the statutory goal of Title IX to end discrimination in education.
2. Section 86.41 and the Little League Corporation Act
Baseball may be characterized by a school as a noncontact sport re-
quiring a demonstration of competitive skill for team admission,162 thus
allowing the maintenance of separate teams; or, conversely, it may be
termed a contact sp6rt, opening up the possibility of total exclusion of
women athletes. Congress, in amending the Little League charter, made
it clear that it would not tolerate separate programs, equal or unequal.' 63 The
HEW must have been aware of the congressional action, since the amend-
ment became effective well before the Title IX regulations were published.
Yet HEW gave educators permission not only to segregate children on
the basis of sex, but to deprive one sex of any chance to play on the school
baseball team. 1 64 This difference in treatment between youngsters of the
same age group who want to play the same game and who can do so,
provided they are fortunate enough to have a Little League in their
community, emphasizes the arbitrary and unfair results of concentrating
upon any factor other than ability when administering athletic or, indeed,
any educational programs.
3. Section 86.41 and Equal Protection
Section 86.41 allows complete exclusion of women from participation
in a contact sport even where only one team has been provided by a
160. 118 CoNG. Ric. 5808 (1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
161. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1975). Baseball is generally considered a contact
sport. See notes 116 & 117 and accompanying text supra.
162. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1975).
163. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 345-46 (1st Cir.
1975), rev'g 376 F. Supp. 472 (D.R.I. 1974).
164. Id. However, the omission of baseball from the list of contact sports found
in section 86.41(b) might be viewed as HEW recognition of the congressional policy
behind the amendment to the Little League Corporation Act. See note 163 supra.
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school. 165 It is submitted that a constitutional attack may be successfully
mounted against the regulation upon the ground that it denies women
equal protection of the laws solely because of their sex. The effect of the
regulation is to deprive women totally of a benefit - the opportunity to
compete in a contact sport - which has been extended to men. Viewed
in this way, the second clause of subsection 86.41 (b) falls within the pro-
hibition articulated by the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.'66 Although the San Antdnio Court declined
to designate education, of which athletics is a part, 167 as a fundamental
right,168 the Court distinguished the complaint before them from prior
decisions' 69 wherein plaintiffs had alleged "an absolute deprivation of a
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit,"'170 and where a violation of
equal protection had been found. An absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to become involved in a contact sport solely because of one's
sex would fail to pass constitutional muster under either the Reed standard
of review' 7' or the minimum scrutiny test.17 2 If middle level scrutiny is
applied, keeping women out of contact sports hardly bears a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the objectives of Title IX - ending biased educational
policies' 7" and giving women an equal opportunity to develop their potential
and apply learned skills. 17 4 If minimum scrutiny is the standard of review,
complete exclusion on the basis of sex is unconstitutional because it is
"without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary . . .17r
To be sure, it could be argued that there is a rationale for separating the
sexes in contact sports - that of unequal athletic ability - but even if
this rationale is accepted, it does not justify providing no team for
women.' 76 At the very least, potential plaintiffs should be able to establish
165. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1975) ; cf. note 161 supra.
166. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In San Antonio, the Texas system of financing public
schools was challenged as violative of equal protection by Mexican-American parents
whose children attended those schools. Id. at 4-5. The parents argued that the system
of financing impinged upon the fundamental right of education and argued that the
Court use strict scrutiny to invalidate it. Id. at 17.
167. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
168. 411 U.S. at 33-35. To be designated as fundamental, a right must be im-
plicitly or explicitly protected by the Constitution. Id. at 33-34; see note 25 supra.
169. Id. at 20-22, citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) ; Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395 (1971) ; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) ; Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
170. 411 U.S. at 20.
171. See notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra.
172. See note 12 supra.
173. See Beuk & Orleans, supra note 133, at 2.
174. 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
175. 220 U.S. at 78; see note 12 supra.
176. See notes 96-101 and accompanying text supra.
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their own team in any contact sport where a team has been provided for
men.
The more difficult task is to marshal compelling arguments against the
very concept of separate athletic teams for each sex, entrenched as this
concept is in case 177 and statutory law.178 Any challenge to separate sex-
segregated athletic teams should be premised upon the argument that
separate is inherently unequal.1'7
Subsection 86.41(c) lists various factors, from funding to publicity,
which can vary between the two teams without a resultant finding of sex
discrimination. s0 Assuming a rough equality in such aspects between the
two teams, can there still be an equal protection violation? The answer
depends upon whether the deciding court is willing to delve below the
more visible manifestations of equality and scrutinize "intangible" factors
that are entailed in sex segregation. Until recently, the analysis of in-
tangible inequalities has been reserved to cases involving racial discrimina-
tion.'" An intangibles analysis was used to find equal protection violations
in the Supreme Court trilogy of Sweatt v. Painter,8 2 McLaurin v. Okla-
homa State Bdard of Regents, 8 3 and Brown v. Board of Education.8 4
Each decision carried the analysis a step further. In Sweatt, black students
were relegated to their own law school, which was inferior in tangible
and intangible respects.' 8 5 Speaking of the intangible inequality perpetuated
by the racial segregation, the Court stated:
177. See notes 92-101, 103-107 & 112-115 and accompanying text supra.
178. See notes 146-153 and accompanying text supra.
179. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
180. Section 86.41 (c) provides in pertinent part:
In determining whether equal opportunities are available, the Director will con-
sider, among other factors:
(i) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accom-
modate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(ii) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(iii) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(iv) Travel and per diem allowance;
(v) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(vii) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(x) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expendi-
tures for male and female teams . . . will not constitute noncompliance with this
section, but the Director may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for
teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity ....
40 Fed. Reg. 24143 (1975).
181. Within the last few years, courts have been analyzing intangible factors in
deciding some sex discrimination cases. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp.
326, 328-30 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W.
3501 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1976) (No. 76-37) ; Kirstein v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970).
182. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
183. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
184. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
185. 339 U.S. at 632-34.
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What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses
to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such
qualities, to name a few, include reputation of the faculty ...stand-
ing in the community, traditions and prestige.' 8 6
In McLaurin, black students were permitted to matriculate in the same
graduate school as white students but, pursuant to state law, they had to
sit in special areas reserved for them in the classroom, the library, and
the cafeteria.' 8 7 Although the state argued that such segregation was
"merely nominal,"'"8 the Court disagreed:
These restrictions . . .signify that the State . . .sets McLaurin apart
from other students. The result is that appellant is handicapped in
his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair
and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange
views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.' 8 9
Finally, in Brown, the Court observed:
Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro
and white schools involved have been or are being equalized, with
respect to . . . 'tangible' factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn
on merely a comparison of these tangible factors .... We must look
instead to the effect of segregation ....
[Education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training ....
Such an opportunity, where the State has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate education facilities are
inherently unequal.190
The obstacles that had been placed in the way of blacks who sought
to achieve academic excellence strongly resemble those which section 86.41
places in the path of women seeking to achieve excellence in athletics. Men's
teams, particularly in high school and college, have traditionally enjoyed
the benefits of greater funding, better equipment and coaching, and greater
prestige than have women's teams' 91 - factors considered significant in
186. Id. at 633.
187. Id. at 640.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 641.
190. 347 U.S. 483, 492-95.
191. See Hearings on S. 2518 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess (1973) (testimony of Ms. Billie Jean King). One blatant
example of tangible inequality cited by Ms. King concerned Vassar College, which
had a student body of 1400 women and 700 men in 1973. The sum of $2,000 was spent
on the women's athletic program, while $4,750 was spent on the men's program. Id.
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the Sweatt opinion.192 Restricting women to their own, less prestigious
teams arguably impairs and inhibits the skilled woman athlete from inter-
acting with her peers on an equal basis, to use the language of the McLaurin
Court. 93 She is stigmatized as inferior and unable to compete because, as
the Court stated in Brown, separate is inherently unequal.9 4
Plaintiffs wishing to challenge section 86.41 must be prepared to deal
with the argument that it is only the exceptional woman who is injured
by the regulation since most women are simply physically incapable of
competing with men, particularly in contact sports. It is not at all clear
whether this assumption has any basis in fact, 195 but at this point there
is certainly no reason to conclude that it does. Allowances must be made
for the effect of past discrimination and the lack of serious athletic training
upon the development of female athletic prowess.' 9 6 The Supreme Court
has indicated that archaic and overbroad generalizations about the capa-
bilities of women are not to be made the basis of statutory classifications ;197
it is too soon to determine that section 86.41's sex-based classification is
neither archaic nor overbroad. It should be asked whether there is any valid
justification for separation of the sexes other than convention' 98 and
administrative convenience.'99 The Supreme Court's sex discrimination
decisions indicate the need to assess the individual capabilities of members
of a class.20 0 The alternative to section 86.41's sex-based classification
system - ability grouping - does exactly that. 201
192. 339 U.S. at 633.
193. Id. at 641.
194. 347 U.S. at 492-95.
195. Experts disagree on the matter. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, 514
F.2d 344 at 349; note 100 and accompanying text supra. One court, confronted with
an analogous argument in defense to a charge of sex discrimination in employment
advertising, answered it as follows:
The 'separate but equal' principle is no longer a legitimate argument in civil
rights cases ....
To anyone who even once has viewed women participating in a roller derby,
the argument that all women are the weaker sex, desirous of only the more genteel
work, carries little weight. The success of women jockies is further evidence of
which we can take notice. It is no longer possible to state that all women
desire . . . any one type . . . of work. Some women have the desire, ability and
stamina to do any work that men can do. Once we accept such a premise, it then
becomes logically impossible to permit continued segregation ....
Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 448,
461-62, 287 A.2d 161, 168-69 (1972).
196. It is not at all unusual for courts to consider the effects of past discrimination
in assessing the constitutionality of legislation. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
197. See notes 29, 55 & 60 and accompanying text supra.
198. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 18 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 21 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
201. The irrebuttable presumptions doctrine (see note 76 supra) suggests an
additional argument, based upon due process grounds, which can be levelled against
section 86.41. Section 86.41 arguably "serve[s] to hinder attainment of the very . . .
objectives [it] is designed to promote" - equal athletic opportunity - on the basis
of a presumption "neither necessarily nor universally true in fact," and despite the
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V. CONCLUSION
The alternative to section 86.41 and the entire separate but equal
system is simple enough -. that schools classify by ability rather than
by sex. 202 Classification by sex is stigmatizing; it influences the individual's
sense of self-worth. It appears likely that women placed on separate teams
because they supposedly cannot compete with men and cannot even be
allowed to try will be consigned to a separate, less demanding program.2 03
As one commentator has stated, "[t] he initial assignment becomes a self-
fulfilling prophesy; as the child goes on . . .she will be less and less able
to compete. '20 4 Thus, sex discrimination and sexual stereotypes will be
perpetuated, as young women come to accept society's judgment of their
potential. 205 If such a system is permitted to exist, the government should
at least be required to bear the burden of demonstrating that the sex-based
segregation is not as arbitrary as it seems - that it sufficiently benefits
young women so as to justify the "inevitable stigma" that it creates.20 6
Joan Ruth Kutner
existence of a reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination - the
measuring of athletic ability on an individual basis. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643-47 (1974).
One problem with the due process challenge to section 86.41, however, is
that the irrebuttable presumptions doctrine has been limited to cases where a funda-
mental constitutional right has been unduly burdened or infringed. Id. at 651. Recent
decisions have stressed that there is no constitutional right to participate in sports
(see note 85 and accompanying text supra), and that education, of which athletics
is a part, is not a fundamental right. See notes 3 & 166-168 and accompanying text
supra.
202. The alternative would probably be mandatory should the federal Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) be adopted. "The basic principle of the ERA is that sex is not
a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women or of men." Brown,
supra note 10, at 889.
There has been one case concerning sex discrimination in athletics decided
under Pennsylvania's ERA. That decision invalidated any sex segregation in athletics,
including contact sports. See Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, 18 Pa. Cmwlth. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
203. Cf. Kirp, supra note 2, at 733-35.
204. Id. at 735.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 750.
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss5/4
